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I. INTRODUCTION
In a case in which I represented the plaintiff, the wrongdoer himself tearfully
acknowledged his role in the tragic accidental death of my client’s son. It had a
huge impact on the settlement of the case. There would never have been a
lawsuit if the same person had made the same comments to the mother during
the 30-day period in which her son lay dying in the hospital, or during the three
days his young body was at the funeral home. The sad part in that case is that
the defendant and his company wanted to express the same thought near the

* Assistant Professor, Law and Social Responsibility Department, Sellinger
School of Business and Management, Loyola College in Maryland. I would like to thank
Adam M. Burton, Jeremy A. Schiffer, Corban S. Rhodes, and Chris Jay Hoofnagle for
their insightful comments, and the editors of the San Diego Law Review for their helpful
suggestions.
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time of the accident, but claimed to have been prohibited from doing so by their
insurance carrier.1

The preceding anecdote illustrates the difficulty with which the U.S.
legal system approaches the notion of apology. The insight that apology
may be an important tool in dispute resolution is one apparent even to an
eight-year-old.2 However, the design and function of the U.S. legal system,
to reduce disputes to dollar amounts, resist such intuition.3 The result is
a culture so litigious that its corporations are required by the SEC to
highlight their myriad lawsuits in their annual reports lest they remain
open to further liability for misleading their shareholders.4

1. Bruce W. Neckers, The Art of the Apology, 81 Mich. B.J. 10, 11 (2002); see
also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29, 33, 45–46 (1982)
(arguing for an increased use of mediation among lawyers and discussing its lack of use
resulting in a capacity for deafness to “ordinary good sense,” and arguing that mediation
can lead to novel solutions, such as an apology, which could actually be in a client’s best
interest (citing John D. Ayer, Isn’t There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on
the Unspoken Promises of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 475, 489–90 (1978))). Riskin
offers an interesting anecdote from Professor Kenney Hegland:
In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we
had recently studied. I put the following:
In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to deliver
widgets at the rate of 1000 a month. The first two deliveries are perfect.
However, in the third month Seller delivers only 999 widgets. Buyer becomes
so incensed with this that he rejects the delivery, cancels the remaining
deliveries and refuses to pay for the widgets already delivered. After stating
the problem, I asked, “If you were Seller, what would you say?” What I was
looking for was a discussion of the various common law theories which would
force the buyer to pay for the widgets delivered and those which would throw
buyer into breach for cancelling the remaining deliveries. In short, I wanted
the class to come up with the legal doctrines which would allow Seller to crush
Buyer.
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer. As is
so often the case with the first year students, I found that they were all either
writing in their notebooks or inspecting their shoes. There was, however, one
eager face, that of an eight year old son of one of my students. It seems that he
was suffering through Contracts due to his mother’s sin of failing to find a
sitter. Suddenly he raised his hand. Such behavior, even from an eight year
old, must be rewarded.
“OK,” I said, “What would you say if you were the seller?”
“I’d say, ‘I’m sorry.’”
Id. at 46.
2. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law
and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 493 (1986).
3. See id. at 464 (explaining the relative absence of apology in the U.S. legal
system as possibly correlated to the legal system’s propensity to reduce all losses to
economic terms and its juries’ awards of high damage amounts for injuries that do not
easily reduce to quantifiable economic terms).
4. Jeffrey A. Berens, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1955, COLO. LAW. (Colo. Bar Ass’n, Denver, Colo.), Feb. 2002, at 39, 42
(discussing certain pleading requirements regarding securities class action litigation,
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The U.S. treatment of apology stands in stark contrast to practices in
other societies, such as Japan,5 where apology plays a central, if not
dominant role in dispute resolution.6 In the United States, however, Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) provides that an admission of fault by a
party-opponent is “not hearsay” and, therefore, not excluded from
admissibility by the hearsay rule.7 Rule 801(d)(2) defines an admission
by a party-opponent as, among other things, “the party’s own statement,
in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . .”8 Consequently,
even though an apology would fit the classical definition of hearsay as
an out of court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted,”9 the Federal Rules of Evidence treat it as nonhearsay
and thus, as admissible evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 applies to “compromise and offers to
compromise” in civil cases and provides that “[e]vidence of . . . conduct
or statements made in compromise negotiations” are not admissible to
prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount.10 The modus

Berens notes that a corporation’s intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud its shareholders can
be evidenced by its nondisclosure of material litigation per SEC regulation).
5. As the societies of the United States and Japan are so culturally distinct, it may
seem counterintuitive, on first impression, to discern anything of significant value
through considering Japanese law. Indeed, given the debate regarding whether law
shapes culture or culture shapes law, and given that the United States and Japanese
cultures are so distinct, one might conclude that the Japanese propensity to apologize
emanates from a culture so distinct from our own that it renders Japan a poor primer for
any such analysis. Recent studies, however, suggest that there appears to be a basic,
universal human preference for an apology when one is wronged. See discussion infra
Parts III–IV. As such, it is apparent that the absence of fully protected apologies as a
facet of formal dispute resolution in the United States may have more to do with the
structure and flawed assumptions informing its legal system than any cultural barrier to
considering the effectiveness of apologies.
6. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 461–62, 472–73, 478–479, 482,
488.
7. FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
8. Id. Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if:
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement,
in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which
the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by
a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship . . . .
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
9. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
10. FED. R. EVID. 408. The rule provides in relevant part:
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operandi of this rule is the “promotion of the public policy favoring the
compromise and settlement of disputes.”11 Therefore, an apology made
during settlement negotiations generally should not be admissible to
prove liability. There are, however, significant limitations to the
rule, including the fact that the apology must be made during and not
before settlement negotiations, which runs counter to the underlying
policy priority that the rule contemplates.12 Accordingly, it would scarcely
be sound legal advice for a defense attorney to advise a client to deliver
an apology that would leave the client open to liability.
This Article joins the current debate regarding the proper relationship
between apology and the law.13 Like Rule 408, this Article focuses
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of
any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a
claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior
inconsistent statement or contradiction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising
to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to accept—a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2)
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim,
except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim
by a public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement authority. (b) Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if
the evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of
permissible purposes include proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a
contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.
Id.
11. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (citing KENNETH S. BROUN,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 76, 251, at 138–40, 431–44 (6th ed. 2006)).
12. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009, 1032–35 (1999).
13. See, e.g., William K. Bartels, The Stormy Seas of Apologies: California
Evidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Harbor for Apologies Made After
Accidents, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 156 (2001); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan:
The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 545
(2000); William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 1, 17 (2002); Charles R. Calleros, Conflict, Apology, and Reconciliation at Arizona
State University: A Second Case Study in Hateful Speech, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 91, 125
(1997); Cohen, supra note 12, at 1013; Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate
Apology, DISP. RESOL. J. (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, New York, N.Y.), May–July 2002, at
26, 27; Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 320 (2001); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On
Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (2002); Aviva Orenstein,
Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You
Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (1999); Donna L. Pavlick, Apology
and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 829, 831 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement:
An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 461–63 (2003) [hereinafter
Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know
and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2005) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Role of Apologies]; Lee Taft,
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exclusively on civil cases.14 This Article adds to scholarly debates about
apology and law by giving legal change a final push. Namely, this Article
provides language, and a rationale for the language, that makes federal
protection for “full apologies” in civil cases possible.15
In particular, this Article considers the aforementioned limitations of
Rule 408 and provides a critique of its effectiveness in facilitating its
modus operandi of encouraging private settlements between adversarial
parties. Part II discusses apologies generally and considers the role they
can play as a dispute resolution tool. Part III then proposes an amendment
to Rule 408, which would prevent full apologies offered during compromise
negotiations from being admissible in civil cases. The amendment to
Rule 408 that this Article proposes also furthers the underlying policy
priority of Rule 408 by encouraging private settlements. Part IV provides
support for the proposed amendment to Rule 408 by examining empirical
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1135–36
(2000); Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 462, 478–79; Brent T. White, Say You’re
Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261,
1261 (2006); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1165, 1166 (1997); Jonathan R. Cohen, Ethical Quandary: Advising the Client Who
Wants to Apologize, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 19, 19; see also Carl D.
Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17
MEDIATION Q. 265, 265 (1999).
14. There are several rationales for this. Both Rule 408 and this Article’s proposed
amendment to Rule 408 address only civil cases. As Jonathan Cohen explained:
This is in contrast to most American evidence law which draws no distinction
between civil and criminal cases. Further, criminal charges are brought by the
state rather than the injured person. If the offender apologizes to the injured
party in a civil case, this means that the defendant has apologized to the
plaintiff. In a criminal case, that correspondence is severed. Criminal
cases also present a risk of coerced confessions. As reflected in the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, constitutional law has long been
wary of the potential for the state to abuse its power and coerce confessions,
both false and true.
Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819,
823 (2002) (footnotes omitted). As Justice Frankfurter expressed, involuntary confessions are
excluded
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a
system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and
freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out
of his own mouth.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961) (citations omitted). In civil cases,
there is typically little risk that a plaintiff will coerce a confession from the defendant;
but in a criminal setting, that risk is quite real. Cohen, supra, at 823.
15. See infra Part II for a definition of both “full” and “partial” apologies.
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evidence that suggests this amendment would, in fact, do more to
encourage private settlements between adversarial parties than Rule 408
currently does.
Part V describes apology exclusionary rules that states have adopted
and gauges the effectiveness of these exclusionary rules. Part VI addresses
critiques of the fully protected apology, which assert that such an
exclusionary rule is not only fraught with moral ambiguity, but rewards
bad actors engaging in strategic tactics by offering insincere apologies,
thereby allowing them to escape proper punishment.16 This section
reconsiders the resistance to the fully protected apology and suggests
that this resistance stems from two ideas—the propensity of U.S. law to
quantify harm in economic terms,17 and the belief that the United States
has a naturally litigious culture.18 These critiques miss the point, as studies
suggest,19 that the fully protected apology is both good business20 and
consistent with U.S. cultural values. Concluding, Part VII offers final
thoughts on this Article’s proposed amendment to Rule 408.
II. APOLOGIES AS A DISPUTE RESOLUTION TOOL
Authors differ as to the proper definition of what makes an effective
full apology. For example, Orenstein argues:
At their fullest, apologies should: (1) acknowledge the legitimacy of the
grievance and express respect for the violated rule or moral norm; (2) indicate
with specificity the nature of the violation; (3) demonstrate understanding of the
harm done; (4) admit fault and responsibility for the violation; (5) express
genuine regret and remorse for the injury; (6) express concern for future good
relations; (7) give appropriate assurance that the act will not happen again; and,
if possible, (8) compensate the injured party.21

16. See generally Taft, supra note 13, at 1138.
17. See Pavlick, supra note 13, at 854. Explaining why the role of apology in
litigation may be a poor fit within the U.S. legal system, Pavlick argues:
In a rights-based, adversarial system, the moral and psychological interests of
the parties are often overlooked. The victim’s interests are routinely converted
into a remedy or commodity with which the legal system is more familiar and
better able to deal—namely money. If interests are overlooked and replaced
by a demand for money, then apology, which has no dollar value and no
predictable value with regard to future occurrences, is of very little use in
litigation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 464.
19. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 482; see
also discussion infra Part IV.
20. The fully protected apology could lead to greater occurrences of corporate
apologies and fits well within the rubric of corporate social responsibility.
21. Orenstein, supra note 13, at 239.
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Wagatsuma and Rosett state that to constitute a “meaningful apology,”
the apologizer must acknowledge five things: (1) the harmful act happened,
caused injury, and was wrongful; (2) the apologizer was at fault and
regrets participating in the act; (3) the apologizer will compensate the
injured party; (4) the act will not happen again; and (5) the apologizer
intends to work for future good relations.22 Cohen identifies three elements:
“(i) admitting one’s fault, (ii) expressing regret for the injurious
action, and (iii) expressing sympathy for the other’s injury.”23 For the
purposes of this Article, a “full apology” is defined as an expression of
regret that acknowledges fault and is coupled with compensation for the
harmed party.24 A “partial apology” is defined as an expression of
remorse or regret without any admission of fault.
When offenders apologize for their conduct, “the offense and the
intention that produced it are less likely to be perceived as corresponding
to some underlying trait of the offender.”25 As such, apologies influence
beliefs about the general character of the offender, and when an apology
is offered, the offender is viewed as having better character.26 The

22. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 469–70.
23. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1014–15.
24. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 487 (arguing that “[a]n apology without
reparation is a hollow form,” Wagatsuma and Rosset note the centrality of compensation
to an apology).
25. Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on Interpersonal
Forgiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 494, 495 (2001); see Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to
Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222–36 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965)
(describing correspondent inference theory).
26. See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to
Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 746–52 (1982); Bruce W. Darby &
Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor’s
Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 360 (1989); Gregg J.
Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About
Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 291–92 (2000);
Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Victims as “Narrative Critics”: Factors Influencing
Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders’ Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 691, 698 (1994); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression
Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219–24 (1989); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children’s
Reactions to Mitigating Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 11 (1994); Jennifer F. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman, Effects of
Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressors, 6 ACAD.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 49, 49 (1984); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59
J. PERSONALITY 281, 285–86 (1991).
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apologetic offender will therefore be perceived as less likely to engage
in similar offending behavior in the future.27 Apologies also tend to
reduce negative emotions such as anger, and increase levels of more
positive emotions, such as sympathy for the offender.28 Indeed, medical
malpractice survey research suggests that victims desire apologies and
some would not have pursued litigation had an apology been offered.29
In addition, there is anecdotal evidence of injured parties who would not
have pursued litigation if apologies were offered,30 of settlement
negotiations coming to a halt over the issue of apology even after an
agreement on an appropriate damage amount was reached,31 of plaintiffs
who would have preferred an apology as part of a settlement,32 and of
27. See, e.g., Gold & Weiner, supra note 26, at 291–92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note
26, at 219–20; Orleans & Gurtman, supra note 26, at 52–53; Gary S. Schwartz et al., The
Effects of Post-Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent,
and Level of Punishment, 17 BRIT. J. SOC. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293, 297 (1978); Weiner
et al., supra note 26, at 285.
28. See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims’ Responses to Apologies:
The Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457,
462 (1994); Gold & Weiner, supra note 26, at 291–92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 26, at
219–20; Takaku, supra note 25, at 495; Weiner et al., supra note 26, at 286.
29. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding
the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1001, 1005–06 (2003) (finding that
patients emphasized a desire to receive an apology following a medical error); Gerald B.
Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims
Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting that twenty-four
percent of families filed claims “when they realized that physicians had failed to be
completely honest with them about what happened, allowed them to believe things that
were not true, or intentionally misled them”); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue
Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609,
1612 (1994) (finding that thirty-seven percent of respondents said that they would not
have sued had there been a full explanation and an apology, and fourteen percent
indicated that they would not have sued had there been an admission of negligence);
Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey
of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2565, 2566 (1996) (finding that ninety-eight percent of respondents “desired or expected
the physician’s active acknowledgement of an error. This ranged from a simple
acknowledgement of the error to various forms of apology” and that “[p]atients were
significantly more likely to either report or sue the physician when he or she failed to
acknowledge the mistake.”).
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 274 (describing negotiations stalling “over the
plaintiff’s demand for an apology, even after the sides had agreed on the damages to be
paid!”) (emphasis omitted).
32. See, e.g., Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual Violence:
Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 433, 442 (1998); Piper Fogg, Minnesota System Agrees to Pay $500,000 to
Settle Pay-Bias Dispute, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 14, 2003, at A12, available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v49/i23/23a01202.htm (describing class-action plaintiff’s
disappointed reaction to the settlement: “I want an apology,” she said, “and I’m never
going to get it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Editorial, The Paula Jones
Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at C6.
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occasions where a failure to apologize triggered litigation by adding
insult to injury.33
To the extent that a place may be found for apology in the resolution
of civil cases, U.S. law will be enriched and it will be better able to deal
with the heart of what initially created the dispute between parties.34
Moreover, as Wagatsuma and Rosett explain, “society at large might be
better off and better able to advance social peace if the law, instead of
discouraging apologies . . . by treating them as admissions of liability,
encouraged people to apologize to those they have wronged and to
compensate them for their losses.”35 In such situations, lawsuits might
never be filed, thereby reducing the amount of judicial resources
consumed by such litigation.36 Without a mechanism that carves out a
place for apology in civil cases, the U.S. justice system, which seeks to
resolve conflicts through settlement, mediation, or alternative methods

33. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1010–11; Orenstein, supra note 13, at 243.
34. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 138 (5th ed. 2007); see generally Cohen, supra note 12, at 1019;
Orenstein, supra note 13, at 242; Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law,
83 JUDICATURE 180, 180 (2000); Levi, supra note 13, at 1166. In addition to the
strategic benefits of apologies for settlement, which is the focus here, a number of
nonstrategic benefits of apologies in civil cases are also posited. Apologies may reduce
negative emotions, repair relationships, fulfill a need to make reparations and to restore
equity, make forgiveness possible, and facilitate psychological growth. GOLDBERG ET
AL., supra, at 138; see also Cohen, supra note 13, at 19; Michael E. McCullough et al.,
Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
321, 324 (1997); Orenstein, supra note 13, at 243–44; Elaine Walster et al., New
Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 163 (1973);
Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 52–53;
Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet et al., Please Forgive Me: Transgressors’ Emotions and
Physiology During Imagery of Seeking Forgiveness and Victim Responses, 21 J.
PSYCHOL. & CHRISTIANITY 219, 228 (2002); Charlotte Witvliet et al., Victims’ Heart
Rate and Facial EMG Responses to Receiving an Apology and Restitution (Oct. 2–6,
2002) (paper presented at the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the Society for
Psychophysiological Research) (abstract available in 39 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY S88 (Supp.
2002)).
35. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 488; see FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory
committee’s note (discussing part of the rationale of excluding evidence of offers to
compromise, the committee explains that “[t]he evidence is irrelevant, since the offer
may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of
position”); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
coupling apologies with compensation for apologies to be effective).
36. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 488; see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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of dispute resolution, rather than trial, is without a tool that serves these
policy priorities more effectively than Rule 408 currently does.37
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 408
Rule 408 was enacted to address the inadequacies in the traditional
common law rules. Under common law, statements made during settlement
negotiations were admissible in court unless posed as hypotheticals.38
As a result, when one preceded a statement by uttering the phrase
without prejudice, it helped ensure that the statement would be deemed
hypothetical.39 Rule 408 was created to address the difficulties that the
common law reliance on legal formalisms presented to parties who may
have been otherwise inclined to settle. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee noted:
An inevitable effect [of these common law rules] is to inhibit freedom of
communication with respect to compromise . . . . Another effect is the generation of
controversy over whether a given statement falls within or without the protected
area. These considerations account for the expansion of [Rule 408] to include
evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations, as well as
the offer or completed compromise itself.40

The underlying policy rationale of Rule 408 is to create a protected
space between parties so as to encourage private settlement.41 Rule 408,
however, contains significant limitations that all but eviscerate this
rationale. First, although Rule 408 classifies evidence as inadmissible
only when it is used “to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a
claim,”42 evidence may be offered for another purpose, such as “proving
a witness’s bias or prejudice.”43 Courts have construed this language to
mean that such evidence is admissible when used to impeach a witness.44
The practical implication of this interpretation is that if an offender
apologizes during settlement negotiations and then denies doing so at
37. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 495; see Williams v. First Nat’l Bank of
Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910) (“Compromises of disputed claims are favored
by the courts . . . .”); see also infra note 48 and accompanying text.
38. M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 675, 720 (1957)
(explaining that “when made in hypothetical form, offers are inadmissible for the reason
that they cannot be treated as an assertion representing the party’s actual belief”).
39. See Robert A. Weninger, Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Trapping
the Unwary, 26 REV. LITIG. 401, 430 (2007).
40. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
41. FED. R. EVID. 408 Senate Judiciary Committee report (explaining that “[t]he
purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements which would be discouraged if such
evidence were admissible”).
42. FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
43. FED. R. EVID. 408(b).
44. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1034 (describing the impeachability inference as a
loophole within Rule 408 that “may de facto swallow the rule”).
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trial, the apology might be deemed admissible.45 Therefore, if the reasoning
behind Rule 408 is to provide parties with enough certainty so as to
allow them to speak freely without fear that their statements will be
deemed admissible at trial, Rule 408 is fatally flawed.
Second, the aforementioned limitations notwithstanding, Rule 408
neither precludes such evidence from pre-trial discovery nor proscribes
such evidence from being revealed to third parties.46 Third, Rule 408
only bars those apologies made during “compromise negotiations,”
which poses two problems: (1) It is not particularly clear as to when a
compromise negotiation has begun; and (2) although a sincerely
apologetic offender may want to apologize immediately after the harm,
Rule 408 does not clearly classify such an apology as inadmissible.47
Both of these problems serve to effectively obviate the creation of the
protected space between parties that Rule 408 considers essential to
making private settlements more likely. From this perspective, the
central legal tension in the effective use of apology as an effective
dispute resolution tool is not cultural—it is evidentiary.
Courts in the United States have long recognized a public policy in
favor of private settlement between adversarial parties.48 This policy is
informed by the belief that private settlements make a more efficient
court system49 and reduce the adverse impact on the parties caused by
litigation.50 Private dispute resolution also allows the parties to craft
resolutions that best fit their needs and desires.51
45. Id. at 1035.
46. See Bolstad, supra note 13 at, 572–73 (arguing that Rule 408 offers “scant
protection for apologies made during the course of mediation,” Bolstad argues that the
revelation of an apology to third parties may result in the apologizer being forced to
defend numerous other suits resulting from such revelation).
47. FED. R. EVID. 408; FED. R. EVID. 408 House Judiciary Committee report
(enacting a change to Rule 408 and reversing an earlier judicial practice which deemed
statements offered in compromise negotiations admissible in subsequent litigation
between the parties, the House Judiciary Committee notes that, “[f]or one thing, it is not
always easy to tell when compromise negotiations begin, and informal dealings end”).
48. See St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656
(1898) (“[S]ettlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to
litigation, are generally favored . . . .”); see also Keahole Def. Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Land
& Natural Res., 134 P.3d 585, 605 (Haw. 2006) (“[T]his court has acknowledged the
strong public policy in favor of settlement of claims.”).
49. See Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669,
673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“Settlements are highly favored as a means to conserve
judicial resources . . . .”).
50. See Vill. of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that
successful settlements avoid the expense and delay of litigation); see also David Luban,
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Given such an unambiguous judicial preference for private settlements,
one would expect the federal judiciary to continue taking affirmative
steps in facilitating this policy. In line with both judicial preference and
the public policy underlying Rule 408, this Article proposes that the
language of Rule 408 be amended to protect a full apology52 in four
specific ways: (1) defining compromise negotiations as attaching immediately
after an injury; (2) rendering an apology offered during compromise
negotiations undiscoverable; (3) proscribing the admissibility of such
apology to impeach a witness; and (4) proscribing the revelation of such
apology to third parties. Incorporating the aforementioned definition of
compromise negotiations, this Article’s proposed Rule 408 would read:
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of
any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim
that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior
inconsistent statement or contradiction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising
to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to accept—a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2)
any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology,
fault, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of
benevolence made to any party, including any third party, in compromise
negotiations regarding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the
negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. (b) Permitted use. This rule
does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes of proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

Such an amendment would bring Rule 408 closer in line with the rule’s
original rationale.53
IV. WHAT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TELLS US
Professor Jennifer K. Robbennolt conducted a comprehensive empirical
analysis regarding the role of apology in settling disputes, and her
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995)
(arguing that “[l]awsuits are expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating,
[and] time-consuming . . . .”).
51. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 502 (1985) (noting that
parties are more likely to abide by agreements they make themselves).
52. See supra Part II for the Author’s definition of a full apology.
53. FED. R. EVID. 408 Senate Judiciary Committee report (discussing the
underlying rationale behind Rule 408, the Senate Judiciary Committee notes that “[t]he
exception for factual admissions was believed by the Advisory Committee to hamper
free communication between parties and thus to constitute an unjustifiable restraint upon
efforts to negotiate settlements—the encouragement of which is the purpose of the
rule.”). Indeed, when explaining this rationale, the Advisory Committee went further in
discussing the principle upon which Rule 408 is founded, noting that “[a] more
consistently impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the
compromise and settlement of disputes.” Id.
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findings suggest that a codification—such as the one proposed in this
Article—will enhance Rule 408.54 In her study, Robbennolt required her
subjects to visit a website to read an accident hypothetical in which one
party was injured.55 The participants were assigned the role of the
injured party and were asked to evaluate a settlement offer from the
offending party.56 Robbennolt introduced numerous control variables
into the examination which enabled her to gauge how different types of
apologies affected the likelihood of settlement and, most interestingly,
whether a legally protected apology such as the one proposed here or an
apology without protection affected the outcomes in any demonstrable
manner.57
In describing the differing types of apologies, Robbennolt adopted
language commonly used in recent scholarship regarding the utility of
apology in fostering settlement between adversarial parties.58 A “partial
apology” is one in which the offending party expresses sympathy and
hope for a rapid recovery, but does not accept responsibility for the
accident causing the injury.59 In her study, Robbennolt’s offender offered
the following partial apology: “I am so sorry that you were hurt. I really
hope that you feel better soon.”60 A “full apology” includes the same
expression of sympathy contained in the partial apology, but adds an
acknowledgment of responsibility: “I am so sorry that you were hurt.
The accident was all my fault. I was going too fast and not watching
where I was going until it was too late.”61
The results of Robbennolt’s analysis were unambiguous. Those participants
receiving a full apology were much more inclined to accept the settlement

54. See generally Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at
462.
55. Id. at 483.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 484. Robbennolt controlled for several other variables in her empirical
examination in addition to those mentioned here. For the purposes of this Article’s
proposal, however, variables were not mentioned if they were not material to support the
general notion that a legally protected apology has a favorable direct correlation with the
inclination of parties to settle outside of court. See generally id.
58. See Mitchell A. Stephens, I’m Sorry: Exploring the Reasons Behind the
Differing Roles of Apology in American and Japanese Civil Cases, 14 WIDENER L. REV.
185, 194 (2008).
59. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 468–69.
60. Id. at 484 n.112.
61. Id.
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offer62 and found that the “offender who offered a full apology was seen
as experiencing more regret, as more moral, and as more likely to be
careful in the future than one offering a partial or no apology.”63 As to
the effects of whether evidentiary rules protected an apology or not,
Robbennolt found:
Differences in evidentiary rules did not produce significant differences in
settlement rates nor did they produce differences in participants’ perceptions
and attributions. Importantly, there were no effects of the evidentiary rules on
ratings of the sufficiency or sincerity of the apology given. Participants were,
however, aware of the differences in the rules as they assessed the scenario;
analysis of participants’ ratings of the likely motives for the apology revealed
that apologies that were not protected by an evidentiary rule were seen as less
likely to have been motivated by desire to avoid a lawsuit. Thus, participants
were aware of the content of the different evidentiary rules, but did not adjust
their assessments of the apologies received in response to those rules.64

Robbennolt further offers that there is “at present, no evidence to suggest
that protected apologies will be less effective or less valued by claimants
than unprotected apologies.”65 Moreover, she argues that “providing
evidentiary protection for apologies may serve to encourage the offering
of apologies, or at least to signal that apologies are a desired response to
an injury-producing event, without diminishing the value and effectiveness
of apologies so offered.”66 Thus, the full apology, whether protected or
not, was viewed by the participants as more satisfactory than either a
partial apology or no apology. With this data, Robbennolt empirically
established that apologies affect harmed parties’ inclination to accept or
reject a settlement offer and that “[o]nly the full, responsibility-accepting
apology increased the likelihood that the offer would be accepted.”67
The partial apology, by point of comparison, “increased participants’
uncertainty about whether or not to accept the offer.”68

62. Id. at 485–86. When no apology was offered, 52% of participants indicated
that they would definitely or probably accept the settlement offer, while 43% would
reject it, leaving 5% uncertain. Id. When a partial apology was offered, 35% of
participants were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were inclined to reject it, and 40%
were uncertain. Id. at 486. When a full apology was offered, 73% of participants were
inclined to accept the settlement offer, with only 13%–14% each rejecting the offer and
remaining uncertain. Id.
63. Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 490–91 (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 504.
66. Id. (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 491.
68. Id.
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V. STATE STATUTES THAT ENCOURAGE APOLOGIES
To date, thirty-five states—consistent with their characterization by
Justice Brandeis as laboratories of democracy69—have enacted statutes
designed to encourage apologies by providing evidentiary protections
similar to the one proposed in this Article.70 In 1986, Massachusetts
became the first state to adopt an evidence rule designed to proscribe
apologetic expressions of sympathy and benevolence from admissibility
when used to prove liability in civil cases.71 The statute provides:
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general
sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person
involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person
shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.72

The catalyst and rationale of this statute is rooted in an ill-fated event, as
described by Lee Taft:
In the 1970s a Massachusetts legislator’s daughter was killed while riding her
bicycle. The driver who struck her never apologized. Her father, a state
senator, was angry that the driver had not expressed contrition. He was told that
the driver dared not risk apologizing, because it could have constituted an

69. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2008); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (Deering
2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135(1) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d(b)
(2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(c)(2) (Supp.
2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (Supp.
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207(1) (Supp. 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1901(b)
(Supp. 2008); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE § 622.31 (Supp.
2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2907(2)
(Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-814 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201(1) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507E:4 (Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2007); H.B. 1333, 60th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.D. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A) (West Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H(A) (Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-1-190(B) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2008); TENN. R. EVID.
409.1(a) (2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 2008); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422(2) (Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (Supp. 2007);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.64.010(2) (Supp. 2008); W.
VA. CODE § 55-7-11a(b)(1) (Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130(a) (2007).
71. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 471.
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (Supp. 2008).
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admission in the litigation surrounding the girl’s death. Upon his retirement, the
senator and his successor presented the legislature with a bill designed to create
a “safe harbor” for would-be apologizors [sic].73

Because the language of the Massachusetts law neglected to describe
what constitutes “[s]tatements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence,”74 it remained unclear as to
whether an apology containing a clear admission of fault would be
admissible.75
Texas, the next state to adopt such legislation, resolved this uncertainty
by adopting similar language to the Massachusetts statute while making
it clear that “a communication, including an excited utterance . . . which
also includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or
culpable conduct pertaining to an accident or event, is admissible to
prove liability . . . .”76 Thus, an admission of fault embedded within an
apology is admissible evidence. By way of example, if a party driving a
vehicle hit another party and the driver uttered the phrase, “I’m sorry
that you were hurt,” the statement would be inadmissible, as it is an
apologetic statement of sympathy. If, on the other hand, the driver said,
“I’m sorry that I hurt you,” the statement would be admissible, as it is a
clear apologetic admission of fault.77 Such codification, therefore, effectively
renders apologetic statements of sympathy or benevolence partial apologies.
Subsequently, several other states enacted rules of evidence to protect
such partial apologies.78 Such apologies are said to encourage contrition
and, consequently, promote the settlement of civil cases.79 Robbennolt’s
study, however, makes plain that these partial apologies may very well
be perceived by a harmed party to be no apology at all, and would thus
be unlikely to encourage settlement between the parties.80
Though no hard empirical data exists that shows a positive correlation
between partial apologies and lower civil litigation rates, states continue
to pass and consider such partial apology legislation. A number of
states, however, have narrowed their protections from civil cases in

73. See Taft, supra note 13, at 1151 (footnote omitted).
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (Supp. 2008).
75. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 827–28.
76. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(c) (Vernon 2008).
77. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 829–30 (discussing Rule 408’s structural
deficiencies).
78. See supra note 70.
79. See generally Cohen, supra note 12, at 1011; Cohen, supra note 14, at 843;
Latif, supra note 13, at 291; Orenstein, supra note 13, at 223; Shuman, supra note 34, at
180.
80. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 491
(discussing the lack of a correlation between the offering of a partial apology and the
harmed party’s inclination to forgo litigation).
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general to focus exclusively on civil cases involving medical malpractice.81
This change is perhaps due to the high degree of trust and intimacy that
defines the relationship between doctor and patient as well as the
increasingly high-profile nature of medical malpractice litigation.82
Victims of medical malpractice rely on the legal profession to provide
them with information regarding how the medical error occurred, what
constitutes just compensation,83 and, notably, how to receive an apology
from their doctors.84 Such reliance, however, is proving to be
increasingly ill-founded.85 Even though few cases result in the victim
filing a lawsuit86 and even fewer cases result in lawsuits that end with
large verdicts,87 a recent surge of large jury awards has been driving
medical premiums higher and encouraging plaintiffs and their lawyers to
pursue litigation.88 The U.S. General Accounting Office’s 2003 report
81. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H(A) (Supp. 2008). The Oklahoma
statute provides:
In any medical liability action, any and all statements, affirmations, gestures,
or conduct expressing apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion,
or a general sense of benevolence which are made by a health care provider or
an employee of a health care provider to the plaintiff, a relative of the plaintiff,
or a representative of the plaintiff and which relate solely to discomfort, pain,
suffering, injury, or death as the result of the unanticipated outcome of the
medical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or
as evidence of an admission against interest.
Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A) (West Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-1-130(a) (2007).
82. See generally Robbennolt, Role of Apologies, supra note 13, at 1010
(discussing the increasing debate regarding medical error in medical literature, legal
literature, and the popular press).
83. See Richert Quinn, Med. Dir., COPIC, COPIC’s 3Rs Program: Recognize,
Respond to and Resolve Patient Injury, available at http://sorryworks.net/files/
3rsaosreq.ppt (last visited Jan. 20, 2009); see also Max Douglas Brown et al., Alternative
Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
249, 265–66 (2003).
84. Carol Patton, Physicians Wary of JCAHO Rules on Medical Errors,
PHYSICIANS FIN. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2001, http://www.doctorquality.com/www/news/news_
091501.htm (discussing that patients and their families first want the facts, then an
apology, and then money, which comes in a “distant third”).
85. Quinn, supra note 83. The litigation system is designed as an adversarial
system that is defined by drawn-out and expensive disputes, which provides unfair
compensation and often shatters the physician-patient relationship. Id.
86. See Jeffery O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMOs, Cost Containment, and Early
Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 287, 294 (1998).
87. Id. at 295.
88. See OFFICE OF DISABILITY, AGING, AND LONG-TERM CARE POLICY, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UPDATE ON THE MEDICAL LITIGATION CRISIS: NOT THE
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on escalating medical malpractice premiums found that the primary
reason for this rise was the losses incurred by insurance companies in
medical malpractice litigation.89 As a result of this vicious cycle, doctors
and hospitals are currently facing a crisis of increasing malpractice
insurance costs.90 One increasingly utilized method to break this cycle,
however, is for a doctor to say “I’m sorry” before saying “see you in court.”91
Hospitals are progressively becoming open to the notion that an
apology can lower litigation rates and encourage healthier relationships
between doctors and their patients.92 Unsurprisingly, the initial apprehension
of apologizing stems from defense attorneys whose mantra in situations
of medical error is “deny and defend.”93 As Lucian Leape of Harvard
Medical School explained:
For decades, lawyers and risk managers have claimed that admitting
responsibility and apologizing will increase the likelihood of a patient filing a
malpractice suit and be used against the doctor in court if they do sue. However,
this assertion, which on the surface seems reasonable, has no basis in fact.
There is to my knowledge not a shred of evidence to support it. It is a myth.94

RESULT OF THE “INSURANCE CYCLE” (2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupd2.htm.
The median jury award has more than doubled from $475,000 in 1996 to $1,000,000 in
2000. Id.
89. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 3–4 (2003). The
report explains that the increase in “paid losses” increases premiums for several reasons:
First, higher paid losses on claims reported in current or previous years can
increase insurers’ estimates of what they expect to pay out on future claims.
Insurers then raise premium rates to match their expectations. In addition,
large losses . . . on even one or a few individual claims can make it harder for
insurers to predict the amount they might have to pay on future claims.
Id. at 22. The report further argues that the tendency to expect higher losses intuitively
results in higher premium rates. Id.
90. Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2205 (2006).
91. See Kevin Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Long Before ‘See You in
Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1, A21 (describing the success of voluntary
disclosure and fault-admitting apology programs in hospitals across the country).
Although these disclosure programs developed independently of the apology legislation
discussed in this Article, they provide clear evidence of the correlation between faultadmitting apologies and lower litigation rates. Id. Since enacting the disclosure
program, the University of Michigan Health System has seen existing claims and
lawsuits drop from 262 in August 2001 to 83 in August 2007. Moreover, the number of
malpractice filings against the University of Illinois dropped by half since the initiation
of the disclosure program two years ago. Id.
92. Id.
93. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, Founder & Spokesperson, Sorry
Works! Coalition (May 23, 2008).
94. Lucian L. Leape, Full Disclosure and Apology—An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Mar.–Apr. 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0843/
is_2_32/ai_n16123939.
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Debunking this myth is the mission of the Sorry Works! Coalition, a
grassroots organization comprised of physicians, insurers, patients, attorneys,
hospital administrators, and researchers.95 The Coalition pursues three
central goals: (1) educate the public and stakeholders about the power of
disclosure and apology; (2) serve as an organizing force and central
clearinghouse for information on full-disclosure methods; and (3) lobby
for the development of the Sorry Works! programs in hospitals across
the nation.96 As defense attorneys promulgate the “deny or defend” ethos
that has taken root in hospitals across the country,97 the Coalition
continues to support the passage of apology legislation.98
One such piece of legislation, the National Medical Error Disclosure
and Compensation Program, the National MEDiC Act,99 was drafted by
Doug Wojcieszak, the Coalition’s founder, and co-authored by thenSenators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.100 The bill was initially
intended to provide protection for full apologies in medical malpractice

95. The Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited Jan. 20,
2009). The Sorry Works! Coalition website is a comprehensive source for all issues and
developments involving full disclosure.
96. See generally Doug Wojcieszak et al., The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the
Case for Full Disclosure, 32 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344
(2006).
97. Doug Wojcieszak, Founder & Spokesperson, Sorry Works! Coalition, Sorry
Works! Testimony Before the South Carolina Senate (Aug. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.sorryworks.net/media34.phtml. Defining and critiquing the “deny and defend”
ethos, Wojcieszak testified:
This is where defense lawyers sweep in [to] tell doctors and medical staff to
keep quiet. I’m here to tell you today that deny and defend is a tried and failed
risk management strategy. It produces anger and it’s a big part of the reason
we have a medical liability crisis.
Id. Tim McDonald, the chief safety officer at the University of Illinois Medical Center
Chicago, recently delivered a speech at Loyola University Chicago and retold a story
about how in interviewing defense firms, he opened with the following hypothetical
situation: A patient undergoes surgery to have a leg removed, but doctors mistakenly
amputate the wrong leg. There is no question the hospital is at fault. When McDonald
asked how the defense firms would handle the botched surgery, twelve of the sixteen
firms counseled deny and defend, and one even advocated “altering the medical record to
imply that the ‘wrong leg’ needed to be removed anyway!” New Disclosure Program at
University of Illinois Medical Center in Chicago, SORRY WORKS! NEWSLETTER (Sorry
Works! Coal., Glen Carbon, Ill.), June 25, 2007, http://www.sorryworks.net/uofi.phtml.
98. See Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited Jan. 20,
2009).
99. National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Program, S. 1784, 109th
Cong. § 935(d)(1)(B) (2005).
100. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93.
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cases.101 Another intended effect of the bill was to protect state apology
laws that conflict with Rule 408.102 However, there were disagreements
as to whether the language for the full apology should be written into the
bill, whether the language should specifically define how the bill would
preempt state law, or whether Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce103 would make such language redundant.104 As it were, the
full apology language never made it into the final version of the bill,
effectively rendering the bill a protection for partial apologies.105 The bill
ultimately died in committee.106
Consistent with the results of Robbennolt’s study,107 Colorado became
the first state to pass an apology statute that protected full apologies
delivered in medical malpractice cases from admissibility.108 To date,
Colorado is one among only four states to protect full apologies.109 The
Colorado statute provides, in relevant part:
In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of
medical care, or in any arbitration proceeding related to such civil action, any
and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, fault,
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of
benevolence which are made by a health care provider or an employee of a
health care provider to the alleged victim, [or the victim’s relatives or
representatives] and which relate to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or
death of the alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome of medical
care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability . . . .110

101. National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Program, S. 1784, 109th
Cong. § 935(d)(1)(B) (2005).
102. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93.
103. The power to regulate interstate commerce is a power granted exclusively to
Congress by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
104. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93.
105. See supra Part II for Author’s definition of partial apology. Similar to the
aforementioned state apology laws that do not protect an admission of fault, the bill
sought to protect expressions of remorse. National Medical Error Disclosure and
Compensation Program, S. 1784, 109th Cong. § 935(d)(1)(B) (2005). The bill read,
in relevant part:
An agreement that any apology or expression of remorse by a doctor or other
designated health care provider at any time during the negotiations shall be
kept confidential and shall not be used in any subsequent legal proceedings as
an admission of guilt if such negotiations end without an offer of compensation
that is acceptable to both parties.
Id.
106. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93.
107. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 491
(discussing the ineffectiveness of partial apologies in encouraging settlement); see also
discussion supra Part IV.
108. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Toward Candor After Medical Error: The First
Apology Law, 5 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. 21, 22 (2004).
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52184d(b) (Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2005).
110. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135(1) (2005).
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As Colorado’s law protects full apologies, it should theoretically decrease
the incidence of medical malpractice suits.111 As a state privilege,
however, Colorado’s statute is not guaranteed deference in federal courts
in cases involving federal causes of action. By way of illustration, a
Colorado evidentiary statute was recently put to the test in federal courts
in a medical malpractice case.112 Noting the Supreme Court’s caution
that a state’s evidentiary privilege should not be recognized or applied
unless it promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need
for probative evidence, the court held that such a privilege does not bar
discovery requests in a federal case involving pendent state jurisdiction.113
Thus, Colorado’s apology legislation, similar to apology legislation in
every other state, does not have guaranteed protection for either partial
or full apologies. As a consequence, defense attorneys will likely have
little confidence in the reliability of state apology laws. Much like the
original intent of the National MEDiC Act, the amendment to Rule 408
proposed in this Article would effectively assuage such doubts through
creation of a protected space between parties, and this protection would
also work to encourage private settlements.
VI. CRITIQUES OF APOLOGY LAWS
Critics of such apology laws, most notably Lee Taft, are concerned
that the sympathetic statements protected by apology laws may become
insincere, commodifying114 behavior that manipulates harmed parties
111. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example
from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1447, 1447 (2000); Hickson et al.,
supra note 29, at 1359; Vincent et al., supra note 29, at 1609; Witman et al., supra note
29, at 2566; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
112. Atteberry v. Longmont United Hosp., 221 F.R.D. 644, 646 (D. Colo. 2004).
113. Id. at 646–47.
114. See Taft, supra note 13, at 1146. Taft acknowledges and opposes the use of
apology as a commodity: “[A]pology is frequently commodified in the legal arena,
where a moral process can become a market trade.” Id. Taft cites a Missouri Supreme
Court case, in which a Missouri attorney, who was held in contempt and ordered into
custody, had the contempt decree vacated after she apologized. Id. at 1146–47 (citing In
re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916, 916 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)). The same attorney was later found
guilty of professional misconduct and initially suspended from practice for six months,
but after issuing a public apology, she was instead given only a public reprimand. In re
Coe, 903 S.W.2d at 918, 921 (Covington, J., dissenting). According to Taft, the
attorney’s behavior demonstrates that when apology is used only as a commodity, its
moral value is vitiated. Taft, supra note 13, at 1147; see also Cohen, supra note 13.
Cohen also acknowledges that the moral process has become an economic tool in that a
victim “may be less likely to sue if she receives an apology, and even if she does sue, an
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into being duped into accepting too little compensation,115 thereby
obviating the moral purpose of apology. In Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology, Taft argues that when civil defendants
make apologies under the protection of statutes which exclude them
from admission as evidence, the apology loses its moral purpose:
When lawyers, legislators, judges, and mediators disrupt this [moral dialectic]
process by viewing apology in utilitarian terms, they subvert the moral potential
of apology in the legal arena. When the performer of apology is protected from
the consequences of the performance through carefully crafted statements and
legislative directives, the moral thrust of apology is lost. The potential for
meaningful healing through apologetic discourse is lost when the moral
component of the syllogistic process in which apology is situated is erased for
strategic reasons.116

In regards to such apologies being both insincere and delivered for
strategic reasons, these apologies are not necessarily ineffective because:
[T]o be successful, an apology must meet the needs of the offended party, such
as the restoration of dignity, acknowledgement of shared values, reparations,
and the like. To believe that a “pragmatic” apology is somehow less truthful or
less effective than a more impassioned one is to value style over substance, as if
we believe that the manner in which an apology is delivered is more important
[than] the goals it seeks to achieve. . . . As long as an apology meets important
psychological needs of the offended, . . . we should not diminish its effectiveness by
becoming critics.117

Moreover, arguing that almost all apologies offered in efforts to
avoid litigation have a degree of insincerity, Wagatsuma and Rosett
contend that sensible Americans would do well to recognize that an
apology is a useful tool in dispute resolution, even if there is some doubt
about an apology’s sincerity.118 Indeed, Wagatsuma and Rosett go on to
argue that “[a] process built around apology and compensation would fit
well into a justice system that increasingly seeks to resolve conflicts by
apology could help facilitate settlement.” Id. Apology is thus regarded as a bargaining
chip that correlates to the amount of the settlement.
115. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1015–17; Cohen, supra note 14, at 825; see also
O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 13, at 1186 (“[A]pology can be used as a tool for
organizations to strategically take advantage of individual victims’ instincts to forgive in
the face of apology.”); Levi, supra note 13, at 1171 (“For instance, critics might ask, if a
plaintiff settles because she’s emotionally fulfilled by an apology, isn’t she being duped
out of her legal entitlement—an entitlement that the apology itself makes concrete?”).
There is also some empirical evidence that suggests the existence of an apology “script,”
in that the offender’s apology will be followed by the recipient’s forgiveness of that
apology. See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t I?”
A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their
Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10, 11 (1994).
116. Taft, supra note 13, at 1157.
117. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 157–58 (2004) (discussing the growing
importance of public and private apologies in U.S. culture).
118. See, e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 477, 495.
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settlement, mediation, or alternative methods of dispute resolution,
rather than trial.”119
Given that no one can divine the motivations and emotional responses
of those individuals who agree to resolve their dispute through apology,
no one can say with any degree of certainty whether the harmed party is,
in fact, being “duped.”120 Consequently, the party who is supposedly
being duped is also arguably taking into consideration the fact that an
apology delivered in an effort to forgo litigation might not be completely
sincere. The harmed party is therefore simply concluding that the apology,
discounted by the possibility that it might be insincere, is worth more
than the larger award out of which it is allegedly being duped, because
otherwise the harmed party would simply sue despite the apology.
Taft further argues that “when the legal evidentiary ‘impediment’ of
admission is removed, the moral dimension of apology is entirely
eclipsed.”121 In response, it is not entirely clear what moral dimension is
being referenced, and it is unclear whether moral dimensionality is even
an appropriate metric to utilize. This moral dimension could be Zoroastrian,
Judeo-Christian, Humanist, Atheist, or the myriad other teleological
beliefs that inform the concept of morality. Regardless of the moral
dimension relied upon, instead of referring solely to metaphysical concepts
as a base from which to critique the viability of such legal mechanisms,
it may be more instructive to gauge fairness by what the two parties in a
dispute perceive to be a fair resolution. Notably, this is precisely the
metric that the Advisory Committee contemplates as the overriding
policy priority in their construction of Rule 408.122 This is not to suggest
that morality has no place in this discussion, though, because parties
remain free to end compromise negotiations whenever they feel the
negotiation is in bad faith. Moreover, neither party is barred from
having an attorney present to see to the client’s best interests during said
negotiations. However, in critiquing the effects of a rule, such as the one
this Article proposes, it is more apropos to look to the legislative intent
of Rule 408—which is to create a protected space between parties so as
119. Id. at 495 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 789 (1984)).
120. Taft, supra note 13, at 1159 (arguing that harmed parties must not be “duped
into trading [their] resentment for the [offender’s] gain”); see also Levi, supra note 115
and accompanying text. For Taft to suggest some of these individuals are being “duped”
may be quite insulting to their intelligence. White, supra note 13, at 1296.
121. Taft, supra note 13, at 1150.
122. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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to encourage private settlement123—rather than look to the intent of
one’s own particular teleological perspective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Debates about relationships between apology and law are intense in
part because stakeholders with different interests and world views make
different assumptions about the extent to which changes in legal rules
can encourage private settlements between adversarial parties. This
Article has suggested that apologies are an important dispute resolution
tool. An amendment to Rule 408, which would prevent full apologies
offered during compromise negotiations from being admissible in civil
cases, would encourage private settlements. Although some scholars assert
that a fully protected apology is fraught with moral ambiguity, evidence
suggests that such an assertion is flawed. Growing evidence suggests
that the fully protected apology is both good business and consistent
with U.S. cultural values.
Often, lawsuits begin with an offender who would like to apologize,
but who also fears a lawsuit. He then refrains from apologizing, and the
absence of this apology is precisely what triggers the lawsuit.124
Consistent with the underlying policy priority of Rule 408, this Article’s
proposed amendment to Rule 408 effectively limits such a fear of suit by
creating a federally protected space between parties which encourages
private settlement, thereby conserving the judicial resources consumed
by litigation.

123.
124.

160

Id.
See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1011.

